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Comme ces procédures sont les "leurs" ils font d'ailleurs tout pour les améliorer continuellement, seule manière qu'elles soient adéquates aux conditions qui ne cessent elles, d'évoluer.
La mise en place d'une approche "humaniste" au management n'est pas simple pour les entreprises pétrolières ou nucléaires : il s'agit d'une culture d'entreprise très différente de celle en vigueur (sans de la conflictuelle et de méfiance qu'il existe entre [url=http://www4.airnet.ne.jp/tdr-3d/joybb-s-b-bsful/joy4.cgi]moncler outlet Au Kenya, un b[/url] les clients et sous-traitants au c?ur du dernier accident au du ). Voici quelques aspects clé de cette culture d'entreprise.
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Pourquoi la grande majorité de conducteurs respecte-t-elle la vitesse ? Par la peur de la ou des radars ? Non, ils le font parce qu'ils partagent l'importance de ne pas (trop) dépasser la vitesse pour leur sécurité et surtout, parce qu'ils possèdent ce moyen simple d'autocontr?le qui est le compteur de vitesse.
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En effet, l'opinion publique les sommera à pour prévenir de telles "erreurs humaines". Les autorités le feront de la seule manière qu'elles connaissent : réglementations plus drastiques (du respect de la vitesse, du contr?le [url=http://www.mxitcms.com/abercrombie/]abercrombie milano[/url] technique des véhicules, et de l'automatisation des passages ferroviaires, par exemple). Cela rassurera l'opinion car on a l'impression que la fiabilité des techniques est bien supérieure à celle des hommes. Or l'opinion devrait s'enquêter encore bien davantage car plut?t que la place de l'homme au sein du dispositif de sureté ces nouvelles réglementations et automatismes l'en écarteront encore plus.
est notamment l'auteur de l'ouvrage [url=http://www.1855sacramento.com/woolrich.php]woolrich[/url] Entreprise libérée (Fayard, 1er semestre 2012)
Peut-on que le jugement de l'homme au [url=http://www.sandvikfw.net/shopuk.php]hollister sale[/url] volant soit remplacé par un automatisme GPS ou par un policier dans chaque bus qui surveillerait sa vitesse en permanence ? Les autorités doivent décider si elles veulent reconna?tre l'homme au c?ur du dispositif de s?reté en exigeant aux entreprises de la culture "humaniste" en leur sein ou l'écarter de ce dispositif. Elles ne peuvent pas les deux à la fois.
. On y lit des propos justes sur le manque de responsabilité quand plusieurs niveaux de sous-traitance sont impliqués, ainsi que des propos moins justes – que l'Etat est le garant de la sureté de nos centrales.
D'une part, au sein de ces entreprises les hommes échangent toujours directement, face-à-face et sans se des grades. Pourquoi est-ce mieux pour la sureté que les notes de et le respect de la [url=http://park15.wakwak.com/~haruka/cgi-bin/off/yybbs.cgi]louboutin Tout nus contre la [/url] ligne hiérarchique ? Parce que beaucoup d'incidents et d'accidents arrivent à cause des signaux faibles repérés sur le terrain mais pas partagés en temps réel. De plus, la communication face-à-face est beaucoup plus riche en termes d'interprétation et de fiabilité de l'information transmise. Cette richesse est indispensable pour des situations ambigu?s, compréhension préalable à toute réaction préventive.
Certains observateurs ont trouvé des éléments de cette culture dans nos centrales. Nous avons [url=http://www.lbs.gov.cn/guestbook.asp]hollister[/url] aussi eu l'occasion de leurs équipes compétentes, [url=http://www.mnfruit.com/louboutinpascher.php]louboutin pas cher[/url] extrêmement dévouées et toujours en première ligne en cas de problème. Mais on peut que plut?t que aux entreprises du secteur nucléaire de la [url=http://www.louboumaterialistanyc.com]louboutin[/url] culture "humaniste" en leur sein, [url=http://www.sandvikfw.net/shopuk.php]hollister outlet sale[/url] les autorités vont réguler encore plus.
Quant aux examens à froid, telles que les enquêtes suite aux accidents graves, ils [url=http://www.gotprintsigns.com/abercrombiepascher/‎]abercrombie pas cher[/url] constatent le plus souvent qu'il y a des causes systémiques aux "erreurs humaines". Ainsi, , président de la commission d' sur l'explosion de la plate-forme Alpha (167 personnes tuées) a écrit : "La qualité du management de s?reté par les opérateurs est fondamentale pour la s?reté des plate-formes. Quel que soit le niveau de détail des régulations visant à améliorer la sureté, elles ne pouvaient pas les déficiences dans la manière dont la sureté était gérée par les opérateurs." Et le nouveau régulateur britannique de s?reté HSE s'est appuyé sur cette conclusion en conseillant aux d' une approche plus efficace pour gérer la s?reté, "approche 'humaniste' au management [url=http://www.mnfruit.com/louboutinpascher.php]louboutin[/url] qui consistait en plus de considérations par les managers pour les problèmes des opérateurs au travail ou personnels".
UNE APPROCHE "HUMANISTE"
Enfin, au sein de ces entreprises les hommes créent des histoires et des jeux. Les histoires sur les incidents du passé sont essentielles pour l'apprentissage et le partage des logiques souvent tacites des erreurs, leurs conséquences et des réactions préventives. Aucune procédure abstraite ne peut cette richesse. Et quand les conséquences graves n'ont pas eu lieu, les permettent d' divers scénarii et ce afin de des réactions pour ces nombreuses situations virtuelles.
Or le bon sens et un examen à froid démontrent que la quête de la s?reté sans l'homme est vaine. Le bon sens nous dit que la course aux procédures et aux règles toujours plus précises est inutile : il survient forcément des imprévus et plus les hommes sont éloignés du problème plus ils risquent d' des réactions inappropriées face à ce dernier.

wlkleo00cpz · Posted: Mon 5:04, 14 Oct 2013 Post subject:

The author, Antony Woodward, is a retired airline pilot formerly based in the Far East, Middle East, and Europe. He is currently living in Far North Queensland in Australia. To get started and to receive your free gift click on the link below.
In-Flight Emergency Over The ApenninesArticle Summary: Some years ago I was a corporate pilot for a kitchen furniture factory based in Trieste in Venezia Guilia province of northern [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] Italy. Every second Tuesday we had a scheduled flight to Valence in the Rhone Valley [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] in France. The company aircraft was a turbocharged PA23 Piper Aztec E. Because the aircraft was not pressurized, most of the flying was done at or above 20,000 ft over the Alps on oxygen.
Some years ago I was a corporate pilot for [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] a kitchen furniture factory based in Trieste in Venezia Guilia province of northern Italy. Every second Tuesday we had a scheduled flight to Valence in the Rhone Valley in France. [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] The company aircraft was a turbocharged PA23 Piper Aztec E. Because the aircraft was not pressurized, most of the flying was done at or above 20,000 ft over [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] the Alps on oxygen. My policy was that all flights were to be operated on airways on IFR flight plans (instrument flight rules) in controlled airspace.
At Valence airport I studied the weather charts and terminal area forecasts [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] for the return flight to Trieste. [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] I then filed an IFR flight plan requesting FL240 (24,000 ft) via Montelimar, Nice, Genoa, Bologna, Chioggia, and Venice. The route filed did not take us over the Alps. The reason for requesting such a high altitude was to take advantage of strong westerly winds which significantly increased our speed over the ground. The other reason for flying high was because of a forecast line of thunderstorms over the Appenines which lay across our flight planned route.
Company managers including the president received a full oxygen briefing before their first flight with me. Afterwhich they were quite happy reading "La Corriere Della Sera" with oxygen masks on their faces. One of my greatest fears was that somebody would light up a cigarette while on oxygen. This happened to me once with another company. I had to switch off the oxygen, extinguish the cigarette, then switch the oxygen back on very quickly. The TUC or time of useful consciousness without oxygen at the altitudes we typically flew, was approximately one minute.
Approaching Ventimiglia, on the border with France, we were handed off to Milan Control who cleared us to Trieste via flight plan route to maintain FL240. Listening to other aircraft requesting higher levels to avoid [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] bad weather, I soon [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] became aware that there was a squall line of interconnected thunderstorm cells over the Appenine mountain ranges which run right down the middle of the Italian peninsular. This extreme weather pattern was caused by an occluded frontal system where two fronts had merged to form a squall line. Just [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] east of Genoa the squall line became visible and I requested a level change to FL280 [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] (28,000 ft). This level was not available and we were cleared initially to FL260 (26,000 ft).
Approaching the squall line we encountered moderate to severe turbulence. Alitalia and other airlines were requesting higher levels. There was no possibility of deviating around the storm cells, so my plan was to fly over the lowest tops at 28,000 ft. then head out over the Adriatic sea where there had been no significant weather reported. While waiting for my final level change to 28,000 ft. the unspeakable happened! Both engines failed and the aircraft assumed a kamikaze attitude in the thin air. Piper doesn't have a procedure for this situation. You are on your own! The auxiliary electric fuel pumps had been on since climbing [link widoczny dla zalogowanych] through 18,000 ft. and the fuel tanks were half full, so it couldn't have been a fuel feed problem. I knew it couldn't have been icing because we were still in clear very dry air with an outside air temperature of minus 40 degrees centigrade. Meantime the altimeter was winding down at an alarming rate with thunderstorm clouds building under the aircraft. I set the transponder to the emergency 7700 code and made a mayday call. It was picked up by an Alitalia DC9 flying above me. The crew contacted Milan Control who gave me an alternative clearance which was relayed to me by Alitalia. Milan misunderstood my situation believing that I had suffered a single engine failure. I made it clear to the Alitalia crew that I had lost both engines and was, therefore, in no position to accept any clearance. I added that I was taking up a reciprocal heading to avoid the worst of the weather and that my intentions were to ditch in the Tirennian sea just south of La Spezia. The Italian navy had search and rescue facilities based in La Spezia.
Ditching in heavy seas was a daunting prospect and I did not like our chances of survival. However, there was no clear alternative. Once established on an approximate westerly heading I started playing with the engine mixture controls finally putting them into the cutoff position. This counter intuitive but I had to try everything at this stage. Very slowly I advanced the mixture controls and a miracle happened. As we were passing through 12,000 ft, both engines fired and I slowly advanced the throttles, set the mixture, and adjusted the propeller controls for an economy cruise setting. We had returned to the living!
I called Genoa radar and requested diversion to Genoa at 12,000 ft. Genoa approach cleared us to Camogli NDB (non-directional beacon) which is the initial approach fix for Genoa. They advised that the precision approach for runway 29 (an approximate westerly alignment) was inoperative and that I could expect an NDB approach. This is a non-precision approach which is difficult to fly particularly in marginal weather with a strong southerly wind. There were also terrain considerations. A mountain range averaging 3,000 ft ran parallel and slightly to the north of the 14 nautical mile approach course.
Approach control advised that the surface wind was now from the south at 25 knots gusting to 30 knots. This was a direct cross wind in excess of the maximum cross wind component limit for my aircraft. Reaching the initial approach fix at Camogli, I was still in cloud flying by reference to instruments, so I took a 60 degree heading change to the left to avoid the risk of being blown into the mountains. At 1,500 ft I broke out of cloud over the sea, altered course to the right, then flew up the coast to the port area where I encountered momentary severe turbulence. Now over the runway threshold and crabbing to the left with the left wing down into the wind, and using a assymetric power, I finally managed to set it down about 3,000 feet down the runway. With a great feeling of relief I turned off the runway to taxy to the ramp. The only aircraft there were a British United Bac-111 and a Lufthansa 737. Alitalia had a 19 knot crosswind limitation in their insurance policy for the DC9 and had diverted to Milan Linate where the runway alignment is north south.
The company president asked me to buy a couple of airline tickets to Trieste via Milan. I replied "Dottore, do you see any other aircraft here? (rhetorical question). There's a reason for that! What I will do, after I've had a double scotch, is to book a couple of rooms at the Grand Hotel in Santa Margarita and rent a car. We'll try it again tomorrow!" He couldn't argue with that and quickly resigned to spending a night on the Riviera.
Statistically, the incident described above is extremely unlikely to happen. It does, however, illustrate the need for obtaining the very best ground and flight training available as well as the ability to think laterally.
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